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THE FEDERAL SURFACE MINING CONTROL
AND RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977-FIRST
TO SURVIVE A DIRECT TENTH
AMENDMENT ATTACK.
DENNIS ABRAMS*
On June 15, 1981, the Federal Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act1 became the first federal environmental law to
survive direct tenth amendment challenges in the United States
Supreme Court.2 These challenges, asserted by the sovereign
states of Virginia and Indiana, have perhaps signaled the end of
a very uncertain beginning for SMCRA.3 In Virginia Surface Min-
ing and its companion case, Hodel v. Indiana, the Court put to
* A.B., Middlebury College; J.D., West Virginia University; Deputy Attorney
General of West Virginia's Environmental Task Force.
Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. % 1201-1328 (Supp.
IV 1980)) [hereinafter SMCRA].
2 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
and Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
3 SMCRA established two separate sets of regulations to implement its two
part program. To date, countless provisions of both sets of regulations are being
reconsidered by the Secretary of Interior or have been invalidated or are still
on appeal in the federal courts of appeal. E.g., In re Surface Mining Regulation
Litigation, 452 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1978), modified, 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
and In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 456 F. Supp. 1301 (D.D.C. 1978),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Only recently most
of the permit requirement regulations were validated. In re Permanent Surface
Mining Regulation Litigation, 653 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
SMCRA had a slow birth; it took Congress six full years and two presiden-
tial vetoes before SMCRA became law. See Note, A Summary of the Legislative
History of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 and the Rele-
vant Legal Periodical Literature, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 775 (1979).
The interim regulations were promulgated in December, 1977, one month
after the deadline established by SMCRA. See 42 Fed. Reg. 62639. 30 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (Supp. IV 1980) set November, 1977, as the deadline. From this date
forward, the Program fell further and further behind schedule.
30 U.S.C. S 1251(a) (Supp. IV 1980) required the Secretary of the Interior
to promulgate the permanent regulations by August 3, 1978, but it was not until
April 12, 1979 that these regulations took effect. 30 C.F.R. 55 700-890 (1979). State
programs or federal programs were supposed to be in place by June 30, 1980.
30 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (Supp. IV 1980). Not one state program had been approved
by that date and, while many state programs are currently under federal review,
no permanent federal program has yet to be implemented in any state.
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rest the notion that SMCRA violates the Constitution by infring-
ing upon powers reserved to or preserved for the states by the
tenth amendment.'
This note looks at the coal mining industry and highlights
some of the many characteristics which distinguish coal mining
from industries regulated by other federal environmental laws.
It contends that the site specific nature of coal mining does not
make it as amenable to regulation by uniform national standards
as are other industries. It also contends that SMCRA was des-
tined to end up in the Supreme Court because, by necessity, it
had to regulate activities of a mine operation well after mining
ceased if it was to be effective. Basically, the provisions found
unconstitutional by the lower courts were prime targets for chal-
lenge because they have an impact upon post-mining land use.
This factor clearly set SMCRA apart from previous federal
environmental laws which do not regulate sources after produc-
tion or manufacturing ceases.
While a thorough review of SMCRA's far reaching program
is beyond the purview of this Note, an attempt will be made to
explain the tenth amendment issues which are the crux of the
states' constitutional challenge of SMCRA. Further, this paper
will review the lower court orders and comment upon the Supreme
Court decisions in each case.
I. SMCRA WAS DESTINED TO END UP IN THE
SUPREME COURT
The Surface Mining Act cases presented the Supreme Court
with its first opportunity to evaluate a major federal environmen-
tal program within the context of a tenth amendment challenge.
Prior tenth amendment challenges to other major environmen-
tal programs had focused upon sections of the administrative reg-
ulations promulgated to implement those programs, and not to
the programs per se. These two SMCRA cases were different; at
issue in each were several provisions of the Surface Mining Act,
and not the regulations pertaining thereto.
Like other pieces of comprehensive federal environmental
The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to
the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
1070 [Vol. 84
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 5 [1982], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss5/5
SURFACE MINING CONTROL ACT
legislation, SMCRA established uniform national standards first,
and then gave the states the opportunity to assume primary reg-
ulatory authority from the federal government. States could not
qualify for primacy until after they had state programs which met
federal requirements. If the laws and regulations, agency staffs
and other regulatory portions of state programs were determin-
ed by a federal agency (in this case by the United States Depart-
ment of the Interior) to be adequate to enforce the mandates of
federal law, then the federal agency, as authorized by Congress,
would delegate that authority to the state. The state would then
issue permits and regulate the industry. At this point, however,
SMCRA's similarities with tother major federal environmental
legislation such as the Clean Water5 and Clean Air Acts' ends.
The basic reason why SMCRA differs from acts which regulate
air and water exclusively, and the reason why SMCRA was destin-
ed to reach the Supreme Court on the tenth amendment issue,
emanate from the unique nature of the industry it regulates and
from the unique pollution control problems inherent in that
industry.
SMCRA does not have the luxury of focusing exclusively upon
the most obvious air or water pollution problems. It cannot deter-
mine what numerical effluent limits shall be imposed on a dis-
charge into the nation's water resources from a coal mine,7 nor
can it dictate what emissions limits will be required to minimize
air pollution from a coal mine.' These limits are set by other
' The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)) [hereinafter
the Clean Water Act].
6 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 712 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. IV 1980)) [hereinafter the Clean Air Act].
" The Clean Water Act only regulates tHe actual discharge of pollutants
through a defined point source. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Surface coal mines have point sources such as sediment control ponds, culverts
and ditches which channel water through a permit area, and even rills and gullies
which form a revegetated land. See Sierra Club v. Abston Construction Co., 620
F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980). SMCRA 30 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980) provides
that it shall not supersede, modify, amend or repeal any provision of the Clean
Water Act. SMCRA can only fill "gaps" left in the water pollution control pro-
gram for mines established by EPA. See In re Surface Mining Regulation Litiga-
tion, 425 F. Supp. at 344.
With the exception of defined emission sources at preparation plants and
other facilities and equipment related to mining, most air pollution problems
emanate from "fugitive dust." Dust is created by vehicles moving on roads, over-
1982] 1071
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federal laws. SMCRA must go well beyond these immediate air
and water pollution sources to regulate the entire manufacturing
(mining) process as well as the entire reclamation process if it
is to be effective.'
During the construction (site preparation) and operational
stages of mining, SMCRA establishes both performance standards
and mandatory design standards in great detail. These standards
treat mining and reclamation as a continuum. For example,
SMCRA determines how close, in feet, reclamation operations
must be to active coal removal." It regulates the design, construc-
tion, and later removal of excess spoil disposal areas," and
establishes mandatory design and abandonment requirements for
water pollution control devices. 2 SMCRA establishes minimum
distances for a myriad of activities,"3 including the specific hours
during which blasting will be authorized, 4 and the specific seed
mixture ratios for reclamation operations. 5 Prevalent throughout
the Act is the philosophy that tight regulatory control during min-
ing and strict adherence to performance standards enable the
operator to achieve the reclamation standards established by the
Act.
Both mining and reclamation requirements are at first
reflected on maps, plans, narratives and construction designs sub-
mitted to the permitting authority. Upon issuance of a permit,
the operations are inspected at least once a month to insure that
burden being moved around the mining operation, etc. SMCRA will not even
specifically address fugitive dust emissions. 47 Fed. Reg. 7384 (1982).
SUnder most federal laws, once the manufacturing process ceases, permits
are no longer needed. Under SMCRA, once the operator ceases coal production
he is still responsible for totally reclaiming the land. This commitment guaranteed
by the bond can last for many years and, in some cases where reclamation or
control of water pollution cannot be achieved, the commitment may be perpetual.
See 30 U.S.C. S 1269(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1980) (no bond shall be released until com-
pliance with all reclamation standards are met); 30 U.S.C. S 1265(b)(10) (Supp. IV
1980) (requires avoiding acid mine drainage). Thus, as long as an acid discharge
exists, no bond may be released and treatment of the discharge must continue.
0 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(16) (Supp. IV 1980) and 30 C.F.R. S 816.101(a) (1980).
"' 30 U.S.C. 5 1265(b)(4), (11), (22) (Supp. IV 1980).
1 30 U.S.C. S 1265(b)(10) (Supp. IV 1980).
30 U.S.C. S 1265(b)(15) (Supp. IV 1980) (explosives), (b)(12) (concurrent sur-
face and underground mining); (b)(8) (mining near streams) and S 1272(e) (prohibits
mining near various natural areas and many facilities and dwellings).
" 30 U.S.C. 5 1265(b)(17) (Supp. IV 1980).
Is 30 C.F.R. S 715.20(aX2) (1980).
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the prior approved plans are followed. Failure to follow those plans
may result in an immediate shut-down of the operation or in a
variety of penalties."
Unlike most industry, coal mining is not a stationary source
of pollution.17 Mining is a continuously expanding process where
the amount of land actually disturbed by mining may depend upon
the mining techniques chosen by the operator or upon unexpected
occurrences. Surface mines cause most surface disturbances dur-
ing active mining. Operators excavate down to a coal seam and
then follow that seam wherever it leads as long as mining is
economical. When surface operations employ the contour method
of mining, the operation results in long sinuous bands of strip
mined land around part or all of a mountain. Other operations
employ a technique known as auger mining, where the coal seam
is exposed and then a large drill bit is inserted horizontally into
the seam to extract the coal. Other operations employ area min-
ing techniques where large blocks of land are cordoned off and
stripped in succession. In each technique, the total amount of
disturbance is known before mining begins and is limited by the
permit.
Most techniques of underground mining, on the other hand,
cause a very limited amount of surface disturbance during the
initial period of operation. Major surface disturbance by under-
ground mining generally occurs after mining ceases. The surface
land will subside as the underground cavities caused by coal ex-
traction begin to cave in. However, the actual amount of land dis-
turbed by underground mining is always variable. As mining pro-
gresses underground, an occasional surface breakthrough is
necessary to ventilate the underground workings, and if mining
has progressed into another watershed or valley, additional en-
'" 30 U.S.C. § 1268, 1271 and 1260(c) (Supp. IV 1980). SMCRA authorized
state or federal inspectors to order the immediate cessation of a coal mining opera-
tion without a prior hearing. The Supreme Court found that the procedure did
not violate due process. 452 U.S. at 335. SMCRA required the prepayment of
civil penalties as a condition precedent to the operator challenging the initial
violation which led to the assessment of penalties, but this and the takings issues
were found not to be ripe for review. 452 U.S. at 335.
" Envorinmental Protection Agency, Development Document for Interim Final
Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for the
Coal Mining Point Source Category, EPA 440/1-76 1057-a at 34-35 (1976). Of course,
underground mining also occurs throughout the United States.
1982] 1073
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try points may be necessary. It is not possible to pre-determine
where additional underground entries may be needed, as roof falls
or other unexpected underground conditions prevent accurate
predictions.
The water pollution problems posed by coal mining differ
significantly from most industries. Coal mines do not use water
in the mining process; 8 and no process waste water per se is pro-
duced during the actual excavation of mineral. 9 Instead, most
water enters the mine as a result of precipitation or percolation.
Generally, however, coal mine operators are required to maintain
the quality of all water discharging from their permit area without
regard to its original source. Thus, as soon as rain hits the mine
site, it-turns into unwanted runoff. The runoff must be collected
and treated even though, the operator is not responsible for its
presence. On the other hand, if the operator can divert water and
prevent it from flowing onto his permitted area, he is not respon-
sible for maintaining its quality. In certain underground mines,
great effort is expended by pumping water out of the mine as
it seeps down from the surface. Furthermore, at many mines, ma-
jor water pollution problems develop well after mining ceases,
as natural elements in the soil and the coal seam combine with
air and water to form acid mine drainage. This discharge, which
can last for many years, can completely destroy streams if left
unattended.'
Air pollution problems are also different from other industries.
The major air problem at mine sites is fugitive dust caused by
continuous, earth moving activity aggravated by natural climatic
conditions. Controlling dust is a difficult task in the open fields
of a coal mine both during and after mining. Thus, control
measures are also required throughout the mining and reclama-
tion process.
Unlike other industries, it is not always possible to minimize
the environmental impact of a mine by carefully selecting a site
for operations. The decision as to where and how to locate a coal
mining operation, unlike most other industries, is truly site
42 Fed. Reg. 21387 (1977).
19 Id.
40 C.F.R. S 434.61 (1981).
" Supra note 18.
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specific. The location and thickness of the coal seam, the overly-
ing rock strata, the terrain and the climate are but a few of the
many uncontrollable factors which dictate where and how mining
will progress. Also, any one of these elements may determine
whether an operator will be able to comply with SMCRA's require-
ments and therefore obtain a permit.
Because of the recognized problems which result after min-
ing ceases, SMCRA continues to specify performance standards
applicable to an operator anywhere from five to ten years after
initial revegetation is established. With few exceptions, all mined
land must be returned to its pre-mining configuration. Various
pollution control devices must be maintained, cleaned and then
abandoned over a period of years. Operators must continue treat-
ing any water which may discharge from a permit area and must
continue to revegetate the area2 until predetermined standards
are met.' These and many other post-mining responsibilities are
imposed upon an operator well after his profit has been obtained
from the land.
Undoubtedly, Congress faced a tough challenge in develop-
ing a nationwide, uniform coal mining and reclamation program.24
Other federal laws already regulated the discharge of water
pollutants from surface mines and underground mines while they
were active, and the same was theoretically true of air emissions.
Many air and water pollution control practices which regulated
an industry while it was active had survived claims that they in-
terfered with state authority,' but none of those practices ex-
tended to post-manufacturing activity as does SMCRA. SMCRA
regulates the condition of the land during mining and, most im-
portantly, also regulates the condition of the land after mining.
Land can no longer be abandoned or left in an unreclaimed state,
but must be restored at least to its pre-mining condition. If an
alternate land use were desired by the operator or the landowner,
a limited selection of alternative uses is offered by SMCRA. Hence,
the Act both dictates and limits post-mining land use in a fashion
unheard of in earlier federal programs.
30 U.S.C. 5 1265(b)(10)(D) (Supp. IV 1980).
30 U.S.C. 5 1265(b)(20) (Supp. IV 1980).
" Comment, The Surfact Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Its
Background and Its Effects 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 953 (1979). Legislation was first
introduced in 1940 by Everett McKinley Dirksen, Rep. Illinois. Id. at 961.
1 See infra note 51.
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Mining and reclamation are not static. They are inextricably
tied to the land and to each other. The land use regulation under
SMCRA, although necessary, became a prime target for the col-
lective frustration of the states and industry who attempted to
grapple with uniform standards on a site-by-site basis." The
Virginia and Indiana cases exemplify the local difficulties
generated by such a comprehensive program as SMCRA. Since
most of Virginia's surface coal mines operate on steep-slope lands,
it was surely to be hardest hit by SMCRA's rigid steep-slope
requirements. In mountainous areas where flat land commands
a high price, restoring steep-slope lands to their original condi-
tion seemed a waste of time and expense, yet it was mandated
by federal law.
Similarly, in Indiana, where farming is king, the State thought
it should determine whether some of its prime farmland would be
removed from production by converting it into another use after
mining ceased. Instead, Indiana contended that Congress, through
SMCRA, was now indirectly making that choice. Since most of
Indiana's coal mining takes place on prime farmland,' the State
believed that it was constitutionally guaranteed the right to make
such choices. Both Indiana and Virginia saw the Act as an im-
pingement upon its power to make land use decisions, and as
establishing what have to be deemed preferences for land use.
This, they argued, was impermissible.
II. THE DECISIONS RENDERED BY THE VIRGINIA
AND INDIANA FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
The federal district court in Virginia Surface Mining" framed
the major issue, confronting it thusly: "The issue before the court
See Friedman & Siedzikewski, Federal & State Regulatory Authority Under
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 82 W. VA, L. REv. 1053
(1980); Shostak, The Pit and The Pendulum: The Senate And S. 1403, 82 W. VA.
L. REV. 1221 (1980); Abrams, The Rockefeller Amendment: Its Origins, Its Effects and
Its Future, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 1241 (1980).
See also Developments Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 1277 (1980). Senate Bill 1403 was offered in 1979
by a coalition of senators to amend SMCRA by deleting the requirement that
state programs contain regulations consistent with the federal regulations.
Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425,
434 (W.D. Va. 1980). (90% of Virginia's surface coal mines are found on steep slopes).
28 Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452, 460 (S.D. Ind. 1980). (80% of Indiana's
surface coal mines are found on prime farmland).
483 F. Supp. 425.
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... is whether the federal surface mining act is directed to the
state as a sovereign entity, displacing its role as a decision-maker
in areas of traditional governmental services, or whether the act
is directed to private activity."'
The district court recognized that SMCRA was "a comprehen-
sive statute designed to provide a set of national environmental
performance standards"' to be applied to all but a few surface
and underground coal mining operations throughout the United
States." It discussed the Act's two-tiered implementation scheme.
The first tier consists of an interim program which, beginning
in 1978, required all mines to upgrade their operations to meet
selected performance standards from the Act and a set of interim
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior.3 2 The
second tier involves a permanent program which, beginning in
1979, required all coal mining operations to obtain permits in com-
pliance with SMCRA, all of its performance standards, and an
even more detailed set of regulations.'
Then, in succession, Judge Williams found: (1) that while
SMCRA "allows the state to elect" to adopt and then implement
a federal program, once that election is made the state loses all
freedom to tailor its program to its needs because the criteria
for approving state programs essentially requires that they mir-
ror the federal program;34 (2) that although land use control and
planning is a traditional local government function, SMCRA in-
fringes upon that tradition, displacing the states and depriving
them of the opportunity to make essential choices regarding post-
mining land use;35 (3) SMCRA not only causes the states to lose
control over future economic development of land, but it also
za Id. at 432.
Id. at 428.
SMCRA applies to surface coal mines and to the surface effects of
underground coal mines as well as to facilities incidental to coal mines such as
coal preparation plants, tipples, repair yards, rail sidings, etc. By definition,
SMCRA's coverage is incredibly broad. 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28)(A) & (B) (Supp. IV
1980). 30 U.S.C. § 1278 (Supp. IV 1980) specifies three narrowly drawn exceptions.
' SMCRA 5 502(c) established the interim program. It consisted mostly of on
the ground compliance with performance standards and very little paper work.
Permit application and issuance requirements were to be regulated by the per-
manent program, 30 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (Supp. IV 1980). See also 30 U.S.C. S 1251(a)
(Supp. IV 1980) providing for the promulgation of interim regulations.
30 U.S.C. 5 1251(b), 1252(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
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adversely affects the value of land by severely limiting post-mining
configuration of the land; 8 and (4) SMCRA has and will cost the
state much in lost revenue and added expenditures to enforce and
administer the interim and permanent programs.37
After this litany of criticism and findings of adverse impact
were visited upon the State of Virginia by SMCRA, the court's
conclusion was not surprising:
After having synthesized the cumulative effects of the
evidence presented, the court finds that the Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act of 1977 operates to 'displace the state's
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions,' National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
852, and, therefore, is in contravention of the Tenth
Amendment.'
In determining what relief would be appropriate in view of
the perceived tenth amendment violations, the court balanced
federal and state interests. Contrary to his earlier pronounce-
ments, Judge Williams substituted his opinion for Congress'.
Specifically, in deciding to enjoin the approximate original con-
tour provisions applicable to mining operations on steep slopes,39
the court found that the provisions were "not environmentally
sound" and did not serve the conservation interests of the federal
government. 4
In the SMCRA case filed by Indiana, 1 the lower court was
called upon to determine whether SMCRA's provisions affecting
mining on prime farmland, requiring return of surface mined land
to approximate original contour, requiring topsoil removal,




Approximate original contour (AOC) is achieved once mined land is returned
to its pre-mining configuration. All highwalls, the vertical face which is created
to excavate coal, are eliminated and the land is graded to blend into the previous
natural drainage pattern of the surrounding terrain. 30 U.S.C. S 1291(2) (Supp.
IV 1980). Steep slopes are defined as those slopes in excess of twenty degrees.
30 U.S.C. S 1265(d)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
4' 483 F. Supp. at 435. Earlier in his opinion, Judge Williams stated, "A court
may neither examine the motive or purpose behind the legislation ... nor substitute
its own judgment for that of the Congress." Id. at 430. No explanation is offered
in defense of this contradiction.
4, Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ind. 1980).
[Vol. 841078
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reclamation plans violated the tenth amendment. Unlike the pin-
pointed issue facing Judge Williams, plaintiffs in the Indiana case
launched a "shot-gun attack" against SMCRA.42
Plaintiffs argued, and the court agreed, that the "prime
farmland" provisions have but a trivial impact on interstate com-
merce and thus were outside the scope of the federal commerce
clause powers.4 3 The court found that the approximate original
contour provisions, the topsoiling requirements, the reclamation
plan requirements 'and the provisions to designate areas unsuitable
for mining were not calculated to alleviate water or air pollution
and thus were "not reasonably and plainly adapted to removing
any substantial and adverse effect on interstate commerce."" The
lower court appeared to be comfortable with its decision to single
out certain provisions of SMCRA and seemed insensitive to the
consideration that the program established by the Act was com-
prehensive and interdependent.
Having easily disposed of the commerce clause issues, the
court then proceeded to summarize the tenth amendment issues
surrounding these same provisions. According to the court:
If Indiana does submit a state program, it will have to com-
port fully with both the Act and the Secretary's regulations,
which contain explicit and implicit federal land use control and
planning policies and decisions, as well as required state govern-
mental structures and procedures for further land use decisions.
This constitutes Federal regulation of the states as states under
National League of Cities. (Emphasis supplied).'5
The following language is typical of the court's conclusions
by which SMCRA was determined to dictate the land use policies:
The 'prime farmland' provisions combine to have prime
farmland defined by regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture,
with an applicant's permit being conditioned upon a commitment
to a post-mining farm use at least until the release of the bond,
which will not be released until productivity has reached equiv-
42 Id. at 455-56. In all, twenty-one provisions of SMCRA were challenged.
Id. at 460. Contrary to the Indiana district court, Judge Williams in Virginia
found that "Congress' enactment of the federal surface mining act is within the
scope of the commerce clause .... 483 F. Supp. at 430-31.
" 501 F. Supp. at 461.
'5 Id. at 465.
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alent levels of yield as non-mined prime farmland in the sur-
rounding area under similar levels of management. [citation omit-
ted] ... These 'prime farmland' provisions are per se land use
control and planning decisions....
Since land use control and planning was deemed by the court
to be a traditional area of state sovereignty, any federal regula-
tion intruding into that area was seen as displacing the states,
and hence violating the tenth amendment. The court assumed that
SMCRA did regulate land use and thus found that SMCRA
regulated not private activity but regulated the states as states.
The pre-mining commitment to a specific post-mining land was
confused by the court with traditional land use control measures.
The court determined that Congress sought to guarantee that
prime farmland was preserved, regardless of the possible alter-
native uses available. Then, just as Judge Williams had done in
Virginia, Judge Noland substituted his opinion for that of Con-
gress. Judge Noland dissected SMCRA's pollution control provi-
sions and rejected many. 7 In the end, it took Judge Noland one
day's worth of testimony and evidence to overturn what it took
Congress six years of testimony and evidence to decide.48
No explanation was given as to why the court deemed it
necessary to decide the tenth amendment issues after having found
certain provisions of SMCRA outside Congress' commerce clause
powers.49 Since the tenth amendment limits the power of Congress
under the commerce clause, if no authority exists within the com-
merce clause to support provisions of the Federal Mining Act,
then the tenth amendment issue should not arise.
The stage was set for the Supreme Court. Almost three years
after SMCRA became law, two federal district courts had found
provisions of the Act violate the United States Constitution. 0
"8 Id. at 465-66.
' Later the Supreme Court would condemn this practice. Each and every
provision of a comprehensive regulatory program need not be justified by one
of Congress' powers. It is enough that the Act as a whole pass constitutional
scrutiny. E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
' See supra note 3.
" "The Congress shall have power to ... regulate commerce .. . among
the several states .... U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8.
1 At least three other federal district courts have upheld SMCRA against
various constitutional challenges. In Concerned Citizens of Appalachia, Inc. v.
Andrus, 494 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) appeal pending, No. 80-1448 (6th Cir.
1080 [Vol. 84
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Never in the field of the federal environmental law had the tenth
amendment been used to so decimate a comprehensive regulatory
program."' If the lower courts were correct in their assessment
of SMCRA's impact upon the states, then neither the federal Clean
Wateral Act nor the federal Clean Air Act would be safe from
similar challenges. Decidedly, each has an impact upon land use
in the states, although that impact is less direct than SMCRA's.
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SUSTAINS SMCRA
AGAINST THESE TENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
In finding that SMCRA is in part violative of the tenth
amendment, the lower courts relied extensively upon the 1976
decision of the Supreme Court in National League of Cities v.
Usery.' " In that case, the Court recognized the plenary power given
1980), the court found that SMCRA does not compel the states to adopt any policy
or implement any program against its will. SMCRA was also upheld as a valid
exercise of Congress' commerce power. In Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, No. 79-171,
slip op. at 2 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 13, 1981), SMCRA was found not to violate the tenth
amendment because it regulates private activity and not the states. In Andrus
v. P-Burg Coal Co., 495 F. Supp. 82 (S.D. Ind. 1980), aff'd, 644 F.2d 1231 (7th
Cir. 1981), the court rejected a commerce clause challenge.
5 Without significant exceptions, the lower courts have rejected tenth amend-
ment challenges against federal environmental legislation. See, e.g., District of
Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded per curiam
sub nom, EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (certain EPA regulations were in-
validated under the tenth amendment but the Clean Air Act as not); Brown v.
EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded per curiam, 431 U.S.
99 (1977) (the Clean Air Act was found not to infringe upon the states as pro-
scribed by the tenth amendment. The EPA regulations at issue were withdrawn
while pending review in the Supreme Court, mooting the issue whether they
violated the tenth amendment); NRDC, Inc. v. Costle, 564 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(the court upheld the water quality planning requirements of the Clean Water
Act); U.S. v. Duracell International, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (holding
that mandatory joinder of a state as a defendant in an enforcement action against
a municipality as required by Section 309 of the Clean Water Act did not violate
the tenth amendment); U.S. v. Placquemines Parish Mosquito Control Bd. Dist.,
16 ENVT REP. (BNA) (1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W 3839 (April 20, 1982) (Finding
that Sections 301 and 404, Clean Water Act permitting requirements, as applied
to state or local governments did not violate the tenth amendment even though
local police powers were involved); State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block,
660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981) (validating provisions of the Boundary Water Canoe
Area Wilderness Act prohibiting motorboats and snowmobiles on lands under
state control).
5 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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to Congress by the commerce clause.5" However, the Court cau-
tioned that this power could not be exercised in a fashion con-
trary to the tenth amendment. It could not impair "the states'
integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal
system."'
A. National League of Cities.
The holding in National League of Cities generated much con-
fusion, as it appeared at first blush to be inconsistent with estab-
lished precedent.5 At issue were the 1974 amendments to the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act.- As originally enacted in 1938,
the Act established a federal minimum wage for non-governmental
employees. The Supreme Court in United States v. Darby"7 upheld
the Act as a valid exercise of Congressional authority under the
clause. However, the Court ruled the opposite when the 1974
amendments extended the Act to cover all state and local govern-
ment employees.
Unlike the original Act, which was directed solely to the ac-
tivity of private employers, the 1974 amendments were found
to regulate the "states as states."' Not only were the states
regulated directly, by regulating state employee pay scales, the
federal government had infringed directly upon what the Court
characterized as an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty"-
the states' power to determine the wages which shall be paid to
those whom they employ.59 Having determined that this power
was "traditionally" reserved to the states, the Court appraised
this function to be so critical to the states' existence in the federal
Id. at 840.
Id. at 842.
See, e.g., Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism
and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1065
(1977); Note, Tenth Amendment Challenges to the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977: The Implications of National League of Cities On Indirect
Regulation of the States, 49 FORDHAM L. REy. 589, 595, n.43 (1981); and Note, Na-
tional League of Cities Crashes on Takeoff. Balancing Under the Commerce Clause,
60 GEo. L.J. 827, 829, n.15 (1980).
Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C. % 201-219 (1946
ed.)) [hereinafter FLSA].
57 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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system that Congress lacked the power to "abrogate the states'
otherwise plenary authority. . . ."I' The primary distinction be-
tween Darby and National League of Cities rested upon regula-
tion of the states as states versus regulation of private activity.
In 1938, Congress told private employers what they would pay
their employees. In 1974, Congress told the states what they would
pay their employees. Only the latter offended the Constitution:
It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to
enact laws regulating individual businesses necessarily subject
to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and
of the state in which they reside. It is quite another to uphold
a similar exercise of congressional authority directed, not to
private citizens, but to the States as States."'
The Court invalidated the 1974 FLSA amendments on the
grounds that they exceeded the commerce clause's grant of
authority since they contravened the tenth amendment. In the
years subsequent to the decision in National League of Cities, many
tenth amendment challenges were raised in the lower courts; many
directed against federal environmental statutes which had an
undeniable impact upon the states.2
When the two SMCRA cases emerged, the high Court was
given an opportunity to judge whether federal efforts to protect
the environment impermissibly infringed upon functions guaran-
teed to the states by the tenth amendment.
B. The Test in Virginia Surface Mining.
Out of the confusion that had entangled its National League
of Cities decision, the Court in the SMCRA cases distilled a three
part tenth amendment test. Each of these three tests had to be
met in order for a clear tenth amendment violation to exist. In
articulating these tests, the Court stated:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute
regulates the 'states as states'. .. . Second, the federal regula-
tion must address matters that are indisputably 'attributes of
state sovereignty' .... And, third, it must be apparent that the
states' compliance with the federal law would directly impair
Id. at 846.
6, Id. at 845.
€2 See supra note 51.
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their ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional functions'.....
As the Court noted, the 1974 Amendments to FLSA met all
three tests. It regulated the states, usurped the states' function
of setting wages for its employees, and threatened the states' abil-
ity to function effectively. Higher minimum wages meant less
necessary police power services and higher costs for those ser-
vices. SMCRA, the Court was quick to point out, was clearly dis-
tinguishable.
C. SMCRA Does Not Regulate the States as States.
Contrary to the decisions of the lower courts in the Virginia
and Indiana cases, the Supreme Court quickly determined that
SMCRA did not regulate the states, although it did take away
from coal-producing states their power to regulate the activities
of coal mining operations. But, the states were not compelled to
undertake any affirmative action whatsoever by SMCRA. In
reviewing the Act, the Court stated:
[T]he states are not compelled to enforce the ... standards,
to expend any state funds, or to participate in the federal regu-
latory program in any matter whatsoever. If a state does not
wish to submit a proposed permanent program that complies
with the Act and implementing regulations, the full regulatory
burden will be borne by the federal government."
Section 504 of SMCRA makes it clear that should a state
choose not to submit a state program or choose not to implement,
enforce, or maintain a state program after having received ap-
proval to do so, no penalties attach. 5 Section 504 requires only
that the federal government, through the Secretary of the Interior,
implement and enforce a federal program in that state. If a state"
452 U.S. at 287-88.
"' Id.
Is 30 U.S.C. § 1254 (Supp. IV 1980). The civil and criminal penalty provisions
of SMCRA are directed to "persons," "operators" or "permittees" and all are
defined so as to exclude a state. 30 U.S.C. SS 1268, 1271, 1291(13), (18) and (19)
(Supp. IV 1980).
If a state chooses not to assume responsibility for enforcing the Act, the
federal citizen suit provisions cannot be used to sue the state. The citizen suits
provision is only applicable to non-discretionary state acts or duties and then
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opts to implement a state program and then, for whatever reason,
decides not to administer or enforce that program, Section 504
requires the federal government to step in and enforce part or
all of that program which the state is not enforcing.
If a state fails to submit a program within the time limits
established by SMCRA or, similarly, fails to resubmit a program
after it was intitially rejected by the Secretary of the Interior,
again no penalties attach. Moreover, the states always retain the
right to submit a state program for approval even after a federal
program is installed."8
Further evidence that SMCRA does not regulate the "states
as states" are the permitting provisions. They apply to individuals
or businesses only. Section 506(a) prohibits any "person" from
engaging in any coal mining activity without a permit issued under
either a federal or state program."7 Only coal mine operators must
submit applications for permits, 8 and only coal mine operators
are required to comply with the many environmental performance
standards of the Act. 9
Both lower courts believed that SMCRA's impact upon the
state was also indirect in nature, and both courts believed that
Congress could not do indirectly that which the Constitution pro-
hibited it from doing directly." From this perspective, SMCRA
also threatened the state's function of regulating coal mining
operations and thus coerced the states into enforcing the Act.
Under this theory, the states were coerced into enforcing the
minimum federal standards, including federal land use policies,
within their borders simply to retain regulatory authority over
coal mines.
The Supreme Court also rejected this argument, finding that
the lower courts had confused preemptive federal legislation with
the tenth amendment's proscriptions.' Since the Act did not reg-
ulate the states directly as states, Congress was free to displace
30 U.S.C. 5 1254(e) (Supp. IV 1980). the federally installed and administrated
coal mining program in place at the time, if any, remains in effect until the state
program is approved.
30 U.S.C. 5 1256(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
30 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
30 U.S.C. § 1258, 1265, 1266 (Supp. IV 1980).
70 483 F. Supp. at 432, and 501 F. Supp. at 458.
' 452 U.S. at 289-90.
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state police, power regulation of private activity as long as coal
mining operations affected interstate commerce.72
The Court recited a "wealth" of precedent to support its
position. Thus, the preemptive provisions of SMCRA were not
barred by the tenth amendment. States could not issue permits
which did not require compliance with SMCRA's provisionsi74 Any
inconsistent state laws could be superseded by SMCRA regardless
of when they were enacted.5 In the end, a state's only option was
to submit a program to the Secretary of the Interior for approval,
if it desired to continue regulating coal mining operations within
its borders. This was not coercion prohibited by the tenth
amendment.7 6
D. SMCRA Does Not Interfere with Traditional State Functions.
The lower courts assumed that land use planning and control
was the type of traditional function of government or attribute
of state sovereignty protected by the tenth amendments. 7 Since
Congress displaced the states by establishing minimum perfor-
mance standards which contained land use measures, the SMCRA,
The Court noted that even if land use was, to quote the lower courts,
a "local" activity, the tenth amendment could not prohibit extension of the com-
merce clause power over that "local" activity. 452 U.S. at 281. The Supreme
Court viewed surface mining and reclamation as the "local" activity whereas the
lower courts intended "local" primarily to mean SMCRA's land use requirements.
11 Id. Citing U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Court reaffirmed the con-
cept approved of forty years earlier. Even though state establishment of minimum
wage for private employees was a "local" activity, the commence clause could
preempt state regulation of that activity. The same was true of SMCRA's post-
mining requirements.
I' The Court noted that Congress could have "constitutionally" prohibited
"any state regulation of surface coal mining." 452 U.S. at 290.
7 30 U.S.C. S 1255(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
7' In previous cases, the Court rejected the word "coercion" and chose in-
stead the term "inducement." The inaucement, also dscribed as the "carrot and
the stick" approach, did not violate the tenth amendment. The federal govern-
ment could condition federal grants on state action. E.g., Steward v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548 (1936), and Shell Oil v. Train, 585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978).
Obviously, states wanted to retain jurisdiction over coal mining and at the
same time demand federal grants to aid in regulatory costs. It was their choice.
The Court would not inquire further.
483 F. Supp. at 432; 501 F. Supp. at 468.
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they argued, had met the second test established in National
League of Cities.8
In review of these decisions, the Supreme Court found that
it did not have to determine whether land use planning and con-
trol was a governmental function protected by the tenth amend-
ment. 9 The Court determined that SMCRA's provisions were not
land use measures in the traditional sense. In Hodel v. Indiana,
the Court stated:
We also do not share the view of the District Court that
the Surface Mining Act is a land use measure after the fashion
of the zoning ordinances typically enacted by state and local gov-
ernments. The prime farmland and other provisions at issue in
this case are concerned with regulating the conditions and ef-
fects of surface coal mining. Any restrictions on land use that
may be imposed by the Act are temporary and incidental to these
primary purposes. The Act imposes no restrictions on post-
reclamation use of mined lands.'
Traditionally, zoning restrictions are placed directly upon the
land." The decision to alter or revise zoning ordinances and plans
rests with the state or local agency which enacts the ordinance.
Once in place, those restrictions limit the type of development
which can occur. The usage of zoned land is then carefully regu-
lated. For example, land zoned as residential will be off-limits to
industrial or commercial establishments. The power to zone local
land usually emanates from defined or undefined local police
powers.2
78 The "integral government function" step. See supra note 63.
" The Court in Virginia Surface Mining assumed for sake of argument that
land use was "'an integral governmental function' as that term was used in Na-
tional League of Cities:' 452 U.S. at 293, n.34. Then, in Hodel, the Court distinguished
SMCRA's provisions from typical zoning measures.
452 U.S. at 331, n.18.
B' See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) and Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
' Local or sovereign are terms usually contained in a description of police
powers. "In brief the police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, ex-
isting independently of a constitutional grant thereof. In general terms it may
be said that it is as broad and comprehensive as the demand of society for its
exercise .... [lit is capable of evolving ... to meet the demands and needs
of an increasingly dense population and an increasingly complex society." Farley
v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960).
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However, the provision of SMCRA which the lower courts
said dictated land use are tied not to the land but to permits.
Their duration is measured by the life of the operator's permit, 3
and the permit is tied to a bond' as SMCRA requires all permit-
ted operations to post a performance bond before they obtain a
permit. 5 The purpose of a bond is two-fold. First, it is designed
to require the operator to comply with the performance standards
in the Act. Second, it insures that adequate funds will be available
at all times so that the land may be reclaimed by the state or
federal government in the event the operator cannot do so.8" How-
ever, once the bond is released, the operator's statutory respon-
sibility ends and SMCRA can no longer be used to exert influence
over the land which was once under permit.
The performance standards found to violate the Tenth Amend-
ment (such as (1) the requirement that land be returned to its
approximate original contour after mining ceases, (2) the require-
ment that prime farmland be returned to prime farmland once
mining ceases, (3) the requirement that operators segregate, stock-
pile and redistribute topsoil, and (4) the requirement that operators
remain responsible for their once mined land for at least five years)
are not imposed directly upon the land. Rather, they are stan-
dards of performance which become terms and conditions of per-
mits applicable to permittees only."
The Supreme Court found that the performance standards col-
lectively were calculated to enable the operator to return mined
land to its prior condition or better, not to dictate land use per
se, but to insure a minimum of environmental degradation. 9 The
language of the Act supports the Court's opinion. SMCRA focuses
30 U.S.C. § 1256(b) (Supp. IV 1980) provides for five year permits which
must be renewed until reclamation is finished, which is at least five or ten years
after successful revegetation has been established. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(20) (Supp.
IV 1980).
30 U.S.C. S 1259 (Supp. IV 1980).
Id. The bond "is conditional upon faithful performance of all the re-
quirements of this Act and the permit."
Id. The decision on the amount of bond is left up to the regulatory authority,
but at least $10,000 must be posted.
'7 For this to be otherwise, the land would have to be retained or at least
capable of being remined. If that were the case, the land might be designated
unsuited for mining pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a) (Supp. IV 1980). This would
be an estremely rare case.
30 U.S.C. §§ 1265(a) and 1266(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
" 452 U.S. at 283.
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upon the importance of preplanning all mining and all reclama-
tion operations well before the first soil is disturbed on the ground.
Its voluminous permit application requirements and reclamation
plan requirements are meant to insure that the operator can com-
ply with the Act. If the application shows otherwise, no permit
is issued."
The Congress, after six years of testimony and fact gather-
ing, found a record containing evidence of the adverse impacts
caused by both active and abandoned coal mining operations.9 ' To
minimize the effects of active and abandoned operations, Congress
chose to dictate mining and reclamation practices. Consequently,
SMCRA mandates that reclamation proceed side-by-side with
mining.92 Thus, on any given mining operation, both mining and
reclamation would take place concurrently. Mining practices are
so intertwined with reclamation practices that it would be dif-
ficult to characterize any as zoning ordinances because the condi-
tion of the land, not its use, is a primary concern of SMCRA.
In order to insure that mined lands would no longer adverse-
ly affect commerce, SMCRA allowed the operator to select a pro-
posed post-mine land use. By obtaining a permit, the operator must
effectuate that use upon the land. SMCRA limits the number of
acceptable post-mining land uses from which an operator may
choose,93 and this limitation, the lower courts believed, violated
- 30 U.S.C. S 1260(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). The applicant for a permit must
demonstrate that reclamation, as required by SMCRA and its programs, "can
be accomplished under the reclamation plan contained in the permit applica-
tion .. " This affirmative demonstration is made well before mining begins.
452 U.S. at 278-79.
', 30 U.S.C. 5 1265(b)(16) (Supp. IV 1980).
'3 This is not an affirmative limitation of land uses. Rather, it is an affir-
mative limitation upon the condition the land is in after mining. See, e.g., Sierra
Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 459 (1977)
(upholding the preservation of significant interior regulations issued by EPA).
The PSD regulations can severely limit the way land is used. Clean air areas
of the country may well be foreclosed from welcoming new industry. In Nance
v. Environmental Protection Agency, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981), the court noted
that a PSD designation in one area may have an adverse impact on the decision
to allow private citizens to mine coal in another. There, the Northern Cheyenne
Tribe could redesignate its reservation, as a Class I (pristine) area even though
it might curtail coal mining in surrounding states. This was not violative of the
tenth anrendment even if it occurred as a result of federal law.
The most extreme example is the decision in U.S. v. 0.16 An Acre of Land,
517 F. Supp. 1115 (E.D.N.Y. 1481). In that case, the court upheld the Fire Island
National Seashore Act, which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to judge
the adequacy of locally enacted zoning ordinances.
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the tenth amendment. The limitation, however, is not premised
upon land use decisions per se, but upon interstate commerce deci-
sions. As the Supreme Court held, the limited choice is a direct
reflection of Congress' desire to regulate the "conditions and
effects of surface coal mining."94
In sum, the Court's decisions in Virginia Surface Mining and
Hodel v. Indiana affirm that the indirect impacts upon the states,
whether it take the form of preempting state regulation of coal
mining in general or dictating how operators will restore their
mined land, do not offend the tenth amendment or exceed the
Congress' commerce clause powers. Federal mining and reclama-
tion practices are not to be considered as traditional land use
measures and thus may be forced upon any coal mine operator
without infringing upon traditional state functions. If a state
wishes-to regulate mining, it must enforce those federal
requirements.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court decision in Virginia Sur-
face Mining and Hodel v. Indiana may be broadly read to hold
that detailed federal environmental legislation does not offend
tenth amendment prohibitions simply because it usurps state
permitting authority. Primarily, these two decisions stand for the
proposition that as long as states are given a choice to participate
or not, without fear of any penalty or other enforcement reprisal,
the tenth amendment is not implicated.
The Court emphasized the significance of the fact that, under
SMCRA, states could not be forced or coerced against their will
to enforce federal law. As long as this were true and the legisla-
tion was amply supported by Congress' commerce clause power,
the federal government could regulate private activities that im-
pacted upon the environment.9"
See supra note 80.
's Mississippi v. F.E.R.C., No. J79-0212(c), slip op. (S.D. Miss. Feb. 27, 1981),
rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982). The Court has to review the constitutionality of the Public
Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) which requires state agencies
to consider various federally proposed rate alternatives during state rate-making
procedures. The Court at oral argument concentrated upon the issue of whether
PURPA required the states to take any affirmative action. In closing, the govern-
ment argued that whatever instrusion upon state sovereignty that occurred, was
minimal. 50 U.S.L.W. 3648 (February 1982).
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It is also true that Congress may regulate state facilities as
long as that regulation is limited to requiring state facility com-
pliance with national standards. Justice Blackmun, the deciding
vote in National League of Cities, concurred in the majority opin-
ion solely because he believed that the majority had endorsed a
balancing approach regarding tough tenth amendment issues. He
stated:
I may misinterpret the Court's opinion, but it seems to me
that it adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw federal
power in areas such as environmental protection, where the fed-
eral interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility
compliance with imposed federal standard would be essential.
(Emphasis supplied.)"
Blackmun's assumption was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
in the SMCRA cases. The Court cautioned that even though the
three-part test may be met, this balancing process, acting as a
fourth step, may still justify intrusion into state functions.9 7 Cer-
tainly in the environmental legislation area, where compliance by
all with national standards was essential, a state could be forced
to regulate air emissions from its facilities, its automobiles, and
the water discharges from its buildings and institutions."
Even when that regulation goes beyond state facilities, states
may not use the Tenth Amendment to avoid compliance with fed-
eral environmental mandates if the federal interest is paramount."
Almost uniformly, lower federal courts have refused to find a viola-
" 426 U.S. at 856. Some have cited this concurring opinion as evidence that
National League of Cities only dealt with legislation that directly affects the state.
See, McGinley & Barrett, the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment at Odds:
Can the Federal Surface Mining Act Survive National League of Cities? 8 No. Ky.
L. REV. 107 (1981). The SMCRA cases show that the same test applies when the
effect on the state may be indirect.
" 452 U.S. at 288. n.29.
" The question yet to be resolved is how far the definition of facility may
be stretched. In cases under the Clean Air Act, for example, attempts to define
highways as state facilities in order to require states to impose standards on
highway users have met with limited success. Compare, District of Columbia v.
Train, 521 F.2d 971 (1975), with U.S. v. Ohio Dept. of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d
1195 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949 (1981) (holding that the federal in-
terest in controlling air pollution far outweighed any state interest in allowing
noncomplying vehicles to use public highways.).
0 See, e.g., State Water Control Board v. Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission, 654 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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tion of the tenth amendment when achievement of national goals
would be jeopardized.' 0 This is true even though most environ-
mental legislation, by nature, will either overlap or replace local
police power regulation.
A state's authority may be preempted; it may have to con-
form its own facilities to federal standards; it may have to bow
to paramount federal interests; and, in each situation, the tenth
amendment would not protect it. Moreover, once a state had
chosen to adopt and implement a federal program, it will waive
any tenth amendment claim it has no matter how coercive of state
sovereignty implementation might become.' 1
Thus, what the Supreme Court termed "cooperative
federalism," in the area of environmental protection, is actually
cooperation out of necessity, and not by choice.10' Although the
Court did not determine to what degree state submission would
have to rise to trigger the tenth amendment, it would appear,
in the wake of the SMCRA cases, that federal intrusion on most
state police powers would stand the test. While functions such
as setting wages for state employees or deciding questions such
as where to locate the state capitol are definitely protected, there
is already a host of state police power functions over which federal
power has been exerted under the auspices of federal environmen-
tal legislation supported by the Commerce Clause.
Sewerage, general sanitation, drinking water, waste collec-
tion and disposal, manufacturing, transportation, landfilling, label-
ing, and other concerns are all regulated by federal environmen-
tal laws. The SMCRA cases will not slow down this ever expand-
ing federal role. Rather, they will vindicate all programs which
preempt state authority and then delegate responsibility for en-
forcing federal environmental laws back to the states.
- ' See, Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir.
1981), judgment vacated, 102 S. Ct. 1416 (1981) (solid waste disposal and recycling
long reserved to the states as traditional functions should not be subject to federal
anti-trust statutes); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2nd Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 901 (1977) (finding that serious problems may only
be forestalled through collective action by the national government).
... State Water Control Board, 654 F.2d 802; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (1977).
10 452 U.S. at 289.
1092 [Vol. 84
24
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 5 [1982], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss5/5
